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NOTES
AMERICAN SHIP BUILDING CO. v. NLRB: THE
LEGALITY OF THE BARGAINING LOCKOUT
In American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,' the United States
Supreme Court decided the propriety of the bargaining lockout:
Accordingly, we hold that an employer violates neither
§ 8(a)(1) nor § 8(a)(3) when, after a bargaining impasse
has been reached, he temporarily shuts down his plant and
lays off his employees for the sole purpose of bringing
economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bar-
gaining position.'
It is the purpose of this Note to analyze this decision in light of
the jaded history of the lockout.
Prior to the passage of the labor acts the employer possessed
a common law right to lock out 3 his employees. In Iron Moulders'
Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co.,4 the circuit court said:
[E]mployers may lock out (or threaten to lock out) em-
ployees at will, with the idea that idleness will force them
to accept lower wages or more onerous conditions; and em-
ployees at will may strike (or threaten to strike), with the
idea that idleness of the capital involved will force employ-
ers to grant better terms. These rights (or legitimate
means of contest) are mutual and fairly balanced against
each other.5
1. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
2. Id. at 318.
3. The employers conduct known as "lockout" is not easily defined
and its use constantly impinges on other types of managerial activity.
In Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953),
an exasperated court stated:
A word might first be said about words. Throughout the pro-
ceedings the parties have attempted to characterize the action
taken by petitioners as a mass "discharge" implying permanent
severance, or a "layoff" or "lockout" intimating a temporary sever-
ance. Were these terms used exclusively perhaps our task would
be easier. But "locked out and discharged," "legally discharged,"
"temporarily laid off," "fired," "dismissed" and "suspended" have
also been resorted to, with a resultant symbolic confusion.
Id. at 534. See also Annot., 173 A.L.R. 674 (1948).
This Note will use the term "lockout" as it has been defined in 1
WEBSTER, NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1964): "The re-
fusal by an employer to allow his employees to come into work unless
they agree to his terms."
See also Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965), decided the same day as American Ship Building, for a case
involving the right of an employer to completely shut down his business
even though his motive is anti-union.
4. 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1908).
5. Id. at 50.
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This characterization of the lockout and strike as being "mutual"
and "fairly balanced" has since become a source of controversy
between the National Labor Relations Board and reviewing courts.
Even today, it is not entirely clear, despite certain language, 6 that
the lockout is the correlative of the strike.
Section 7 of the Wagner Act 7 conferred certain rights upon
employees. As a means of protection, sections 8(a)(1) through
8(a) (5)8 were enacted, making it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to abridge these rights. An early version of 8(a) (1) de-
clared it to be an unfair labor practice "to attempt, by interference,
influence, restraint, favor, coercion, or lockout, or by any other
means, to impair the right of employees . . . ."I In deference
to criticism of this early section, enumeration of the lockout was
deleted.10 Nevertheless, a lockout conflicts with protected rights
and, yet, in certain instances it will be declared an unfair labor
6. Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d at 533. See also
Leonard v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1952), where the court, after
review of applicable statutory provisions, stated:
From the above expressions in the statute and the linking of
the terms 'strike' and 'lockout', it is arguable that Congress has
recognized strikes and lockouts as correlative powers, to be em-
ployed by the adversaries in collective bargaining when an im-
passe in negotiations is reached.
Id. at 441.
7. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964). This section provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection....
This provision has been retained in § 7 of subsequent amendments to the
labor acts. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
8. Section 8(a) (1) of the present Act renders it an unfair labor prac-
tice "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed" in Section 7. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1)
(1964).
Section 8 (a) (2) of the present Act renders it an unfair labor practice
"to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization, or contribute financial or other support to it." 49
Stat. 452 (1953), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1964).
Section 8(a) (3) of the present Act renders it an unfair labor practice
"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership
in any labor organization." 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3)
(1964).
Section 8(a) (4) of the present Act renders it an unfair labor practice
"to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter." 49 Stat. 452
(1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(4) (1964).
Section 8(a) (5) of the present Act renders it an unfair labor practice
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives" of employees.
49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1964).
9. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1934). (Emphasis added.)
10. See Meltzer, Single-Employer and Multi-Employer Lockouts Un-
der the Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. CmI. L. Rv. 70, 78-79 (1957).
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practice and in others it will not. The area of proscription is still
dubitable.
The legality of certain lockouts has been predicated upon
whether they were offensive or defensive.' Arguments by the
employer were based on the rationalization that a strike or strike
threat legalized the lockout as defensive in nature. If the Board
found that there was no real strike threat, however, the lockout
was found to be offensive and illegal. 12 At one time, locking out
on a threat of strike presented two obstacles. It was conceded
that a lockout based on a mere strike threat would constitute an
unfair labor practice, 1 but this admission was criticized and aban-
doned. 14  In another case, the Board held that even if a strike
threat existed it would not be sufficient justification for the use
of the lockout, but the enforcement of this ruling was refused.15
The use of the multi-employer bargaining unit to introduce
more equality into collective bargaining16 raised a question as to
the legality of a lockout instituted by the remaining members of
such a unit in response to a strike against one of the partici-
pating employers. In Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 17 the Board was
of the opinion that such conduct constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice. This position was reasserted in Davis Furniture Co.' s and
Spalding Avery Lumber Co.' 9 But when the courts of appeals
were called upon to enforce the orders, this conclusion was
criticized.
20
11. Davis Furniture Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 279 (1951), 100 N.L.R.B. 1016
(1952); Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), 99 N.L.R.B.
1448 (1952). See also Note, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 128 (1962) where the author
characterizes the Board's decisions as consistent only when rationalized in
terms of an offensive-defensive dichotomy.
12. See, e.g., Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 39
(1963), enforced, 340 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965); Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp.,
121 N.L.R.B. 334, enforced, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959).
13. Brief for the NLRB, p. 9, Local 449, Truck Drivers Union v.
NLRB (Buffalo Linen). 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956). The court stated:
The Board, in its brief, concedes, as it must, the basic principle
that an employer who locks out its employees on mere threat of,
or in anticipation of, a strike is guilty of an unfair labor practice.
Id. at 113.
14. Meltzer, supra note 10, at 71-72.
15. American Brake Shoe Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 820 (1956), vacated,
244 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1957). The court stated: "We conclude that the
imminent probability of a permanent loss of business was sufficient justifi-
cation for petitioners defensive action. . . ." Id. at 494.
16. For a more thorough review of multi-employer bargaining see
FREIDEN, Tim TAFT-HARTLEY ACT AND MULTI-EMPLOYER BARGAINING (1948);
see also Meltzer, supra note 10, at 83-87.
17. 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), 99 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1952).
18. 94 N.L.R.B. 279 (1951), 100 NL.RB 1016 (1952)
19. 103 N.L.R.B. 1516 (1953).
20. NLRB v. Spalding Avery Lumber Co., 220 F.2d 673 (8th Cir.
1955); Leonard v. NLRB (Davis Furniture Co.), 197 F.2d 435 (9th Cir.
1952), 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953); Morand Bros Beverage Co. v. NLRB,
190 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1951), 204 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1953).
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In Buffalo Linen Supply Co.,2' the Board, in condescension
to this criticism, changed its position and held that such a lockout
was permissible. This conclusion, however, met with disapproval
in the Second Circuit where-the court held that the multi-employer
lockout was illegal,22 prompting one writer to observe that the
NLRB is always wrong.23 Finally, the Supreme Court, in NLRB
v. Local 449, Truck Drivers Union,24 settled the conflict by holding
that the unstruck members do not commit an unfair labor practice
when they temporarily lock out their employees as a defense to a
union strike against one of the members. Such action by the
employers is deemed necessary to preserve the integrity of the
bargaining unit.2 5
There are, of course, as many different types of lockouts as
there are labor cases involving them. Nearly every dispute con-
tains certain facts pertaining to the lockout which distinguishes it
from another, similar lockout. There appear, however, to be three
basic varieties. For the purposes of the following discussion these
will be referred to as illegal anti-union lockouts, legal economic
lockouts, and bargaining lockouts, the legality of which is the
subject of this Note. Admittedly, in most instances it will be im-
possible to say that the fact situation surrounding the lockout
places it solely in one of the three categories.
2 6
It seems that the use of an anti-union lockout is clearly an inter-
ference, restraint or coercion violative of section 8 (a) (1), and a dis-
crimination violative of section 8 (a) (3). This would be especially
true where, during organizational activities, the employer closes
his plant and states that it will remain closed until the employees
abandon union affiliations.2 7  Conversely, an employer may not
21. 109 N.L.R.B. 447 (1954).
22. Local 449, Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB (Buffalo Linen), 231
F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1956).
23. Meltzer, supra note 10, at 70.
24. 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
25. See the following cases where Truck Drivers was controlling:
Local 6, New York Mailer's Union v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1964);
NLRB v. Great Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 277 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1960).
But see NLRB v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1965); Philadelphia. Marine Trade Ass'n v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir.
1964); Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d
165 (10th Cir. 1961). See also NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) where
the unstruck members are.permitted to hire temporary replacements for
those workers who are locked out.
26. See Meltzer, supra note 10, at 76, where the author characterizes
the distinction between economic and bargaining lockouts as "difficult to
administer." See also Koretz, Legality of the Lockout, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV.
251, 268 (1953) where the author states that an attempt to distinguish
between anti-union and economic motivation "borders on the absurd."
27. See,. e.g., NLRB v. Norma Mining Corp., 206 F.2d 38 (4th Cir.
1953); NLRB v. Moltrup Steel Products Co., 121 F.2d 612 (3d Cir. 1941);
NLRB v. Somerset Shoe Co., 111 F.2d 681 (1st Cir. 1940); NLRB v. Hop-




use lockout pressure to assist a particular union.2s And an em-
ployer's attempt to evade the union's request to bargain by
locking out active unionists is proscribed.29  Thus, where the
employer uses the lockout as a means of undermining organiza-
tional efforts or evading the duty to bargain, it is denominated
anti-union and is an unfair labor practice.30
The economic lockout is of interest and legal in two situations.
In the first of these, the lockout is not precipitated by a failure to
reach agreement in bargaining for a contract. The lockout, layoff
or shutdown is dictated, not by an anti-union animus, 31 but by
reason of efficiency, economy, physical or climatic conditions as
where one method of production becomes outmoded and is re-
placed by a new one, resulting in a termination of employment.
32
The second economic situation involves a lockout incident to a
labor dispute resulting from a bargaining failure.3 3 This lockout
is generally preceded by a strike or strike threat.34 Afterwards, if
the employer can establish that the lockout was economically
necessary, an unfair labor practice charge can be successfully re-
sisted. This is true where shown that it would be uneconomical to
operate with the unstruck employees, "' 5 or to prevent plant sei-
28. See, e.g., NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 135 U.S. 685
(1942); NLRB v. Cowell Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1945);
NLRB v. Lund, 103 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1939).
29. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cape County Milling Co., 140 F.2d 543 (8th
Cir. 1944); NLRB v. Crystal Spring Finishing Co., 116 F.2d 669 (1st
Cir. 1941).
30. A more thorough enumeration of the characteristics of illegal
motivation may be found in Note, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 1123, 1125-26
(1950).
31. See Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 601 (1947) where the
Board states:
We recognize that an employer may lawfully discontinue or
reduce operations for any reason whatsoever, good or bad, sound
or unsound, in its sole discretion, and without censorship from this
Board, provided only that the employer's action is not motivated
by a purpose to interfere with and defeat its employees' union
activities.
Id. at 602.
32. See, e.g., NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d
848 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Trimfit of Calif., Inc., 211 F.2d 206 (9th Cir.
1952); NLRB v. Goodyear Footwear Corp., 186 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1951).
Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1938).
33. Hereafter, this will be the context in which the term "economic
lockout" is used.
34. In Local 449, Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d
Cir. 1956), the court stated that "the Board has held that only in unusual
cases of economic hardship is an employer justified in locking out its
employees when faced with a threatened strike. Id. at 113. (Emphasis
added).
35. United Elect., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338
(D.C. Cir. 1955); Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1953).
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zure,36 or to combat intermittent work stoppages, 7 or to avoid
material spoilage,3 8 as well as to protect good will which would be
debased if deliveries could not be timely made to customers. 39
The inability to differentiate between lockouts is greatest when it
involves this second type of economic lockout and the bargaining
lockout.
Basically, the economic lockout is designed to reduce the harm-
ful consequences which may arise if the union initiates a strike,
whereas the bargaining lockout is intended to improve the em-
ployer's bargaining position by bringing pressure to bear on the
union. The bargaining lockout is not reputed to be a means of
undermining organizational efforts by destroying the union or an
attempt to evade the duty to bargain. Its only debility is that it is
not a defense to the consequences of union activity but is offensive
in character.
40
The Morand Bros. case, involving multi-employer bargaining,
was the first instance where the propriety of the bargaining
lockout was considered. In dissenting from the majority decision,
one member of the Board categorized the lockout as economic
and said:
[S]uch an economic lockout, not unlawfully motivated, is
not rendered illegal simply because it had the effect of
neutralizing the economic pressure exerted by a union to
resolve in its favor an impasse arising out of good faith
bargaining negotiations.
4 1
When the Board's order went up to the Seventh Circuit for en-
forcement the court indicated that the employers had a right to
counter the strike's effectiveness by locking out other employees.
42
The case was then remanded for a finding as to whether the
lockout was an illegal discharge of employees for their union
activities. On remand, the majority Board members expressed
their disapproval of the court's statements. 43  When the order
was again reviewed, however, the court said: "[P]resent a bar-
gaining impasse, the lockout would be justified as the assertion of
the employer's corollary to the Union's right to strike, absent, of
course, affirmative proof of unlawful intent."'44 The court, none-
theless, enforced the Board's order against the employer based on
the finding that the activity constituted an illegal discharge rather
than a temporary lockout.
Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit was having a reparte with the
36. Link-Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940).
37. International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951).
38. Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
39. Betts Cadillac-Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268 (1951).
40. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
41. 91 N.L.R.B. at 423. (Emphasis added.)
42. 190 F.2d at 582.
43. 99 N.L.R.B. at 1455.
44. 204 F.2d at 533. (Emphasis added.)
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Board over the Davis Furniture case which was in nearly all re-
spects similar to Morand.45  The court, in remanding the case
to the Board, stated: "[I]t is arguable that Congress has recog-
nized strikes and lockouts as correlative powers, to be employed
by the adversaries in collective bargaining when an impasse in
negotiations is reached. ' 46 The Board, in its supplemental deci-
sion, rejected this view and held that the multi-employer lockout
was unlawful even if its purpose was to break a bargaining im-
passe by use of economic pressure.47 On review, the Ninth Circuit
again refused to enforce the Board's order.
48
The conflict between the courts and the Board over the legal-
ity of multi-employer lockouts continued for some time.49 Finally,
the Supreme Court, in the Truck Drivers case, decided that such
activity on the part of the employers did not constitute an unfair
labor practice. 50 This decision did not legalize the bargaining
lockout as an offensive weapon and, hence, the employers' correla-
tive of the strike. Rather, the Court said specifically: "The narrow
question to be decided is whether a temporary lockout may law-
fully be used as a defense to a union strike tactic which threatens
the destruction of the employers' interest in bargaining on a
group basis."' 1
Indeed, the Court's principal concern was with preserving the
integrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit against a whip-
saw strike. The Court felt that economic and operational factors
justified this type of lockout and left it to the Board to balance
the conflicting interests of employers and employees. Whether a
single employer could resort to the lockout as a correlative of the
strike to improve his bargaining position, without regard to the
economic or operational factors involved, was left undecided by
the Court.52  This, of course, promoted uncertainty and led to
conflicting decisions in the circuits.
53
45. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
46. 197 F.2d at 441.
47. See note 18 supra.
48. Leonard v. NLRB (Davis Furniture Co.), 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.
1953).
49. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
50. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
51. 253 U.S. at 93. (Emphasis added.)
52. There was no reason to come to the conclusion that simply
because multi-employer lockouts were legalized similar treatment would
be accorded the single-employer bargaining lockout. Meltzer, supra note
10, at 87-97, lists several reasons why even if the single-employer lockout
is proscribed, the multi-employer lockout should not be.
53. Compare Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529 (7th
Cir. 1953), Leonard v. NLRB (Davis Furniture Co.), 197 F.2d 435 (9th Cir.
1952), and NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962
with Local 449, Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB (Buffalo Linen), 231 F.2d
110 (2d Cir. 1956), Utah Plumbing and Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB,
294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961) and Quaker State Oil Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 270
F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959).
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At the time of the Truck Drivers decision the circuits were
arrayed in the following fashion. The Seventh and Ninth, by
virtue of Morand and Davis Furniture respectively, were of the
opinion that a bargaining lockout should be legal. The Second, in
its Buffalo Linen decision, agreed with the proposition that strikes
and lockouts cannot be equated 4 and, therefore, would probably
have found the bargaining lockout to be illegal.
Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. NLRB 55 gave the Third Circuit
an opportunity to express an opinion. The court accepted the
findings of the Board that the employer had used a lockout as an
offensive weapon to better its bargaining position. The result of
this, according to both Board and court, was a distortion of the
bargaining process giving the employer an unfair advantage. Un-
der the authority of the Truck Drivers case, the Board balanced
the interests against the employer.56 Thus the Third Circuit found
illegality in the bargaining lockout.
Then the Tenth Circuit, in Utah Plumbing and Heating Con-
tractors Ass'n v. NLRB,57 joined the Third in proscribing the
bargaining lockout. The employer contended that a lockout may
be used as an economic weapon at the termination of the contract
as the corollary of the union strike. This argument was rejected.
The court found no economic motivation for the lockout and
negotiations had not reached an impasse.
More recently, the Fifth Circuit, in NLRB v. Dalton Brick &
Tile Corp.,58 joined the Seventh and Ninth by recognizing that
the bargaining lockout is not illegal per se. Rather, any illegality
must be established under specific sections of the NLRA. The
court further pointed out that the employer's justification for us-
ing a lockout is not limited only to cases of economic hardship.
Therefore, reasoned the court, the bargaining lockout, unless it
runs afoul of a particular section proscribing it, is legal.
On May 1, 1961 the eight unions representing the employees
of the American Ship Building Co., which operates four yards
on the Great Lakes,5 9 notified the company of their intention to
54. This was the old Board opinion as it was articulated in the
Morand and Davis Furniture cases prior to the change of attitude which
was manifested in the Truck*Drivers (Buffalo Linen) case.
55. 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959).
56. Whether the Third Circuit actively believed in the illegality of
the bargaining lockout is not clear since the court stated:
Whether we would agree with the reasoning of the Board or
not is unimportant. What is all important is the fact that the
Board has courageously and ably recognized its responsibility in
this extremely sensitive field.
270 F.2d at 45. However, the court went on to characterize the Board's
exercise of discretion as "wise."
57. 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961).
58. 301 F.2d 886. (5th Cir. 1962).




modify the collective bargaining contract which was due to expire
on August 1, 1961. On five previous occasions the unions had
supported their demands by striking. During the present negotia-
tions the employer was apprehensive of the unions' strike plans.
Although the union negotiator assured the employer that he in-
tended to reach agreement without a strike, he did concede that
he had incomplete control over the unions.6 0  The parties nego-
tiated throughout the spring and early summer. Finally, on
August 9, they separated, leaving substantial issues unresolved.
Two days later the employer locked out certain of his workers.6 1
Thereafter, negotiations were resumed and on October 27, 1961 a
two year contract was agreed upon. The unions then filed a claim
with the Board predicated on the action taken on August 11. A
complaint was issued charging the employer with a violation of
sections 8(a) (1), 8(a) (3) and 8(a) (5).62
The Trial Examiner found that after the expiration of the old
contract on August 1 the employer had a "sword of Damocles"
hanging over his head in view of the history of past strikes.63 He
further found that the employer's main purpose in locking out was
to avert the consequences of a strike. He concluded that these
facts gave the employer economic justification for the lockout
and the ancillary purpose to break the impasse was immaterial.
6 4
The Board, in a 3-2 decision,6 5 overturned the Examiner. It
found that, based on the no-strike assurances, the record did not
support the conclusion that the employer had reasonable grounds
to fear a strike.66 Therefore, concluded the Board, the conduct was
illegal "for in such a situation the lockout is deemed an offensive
weapon intended to force the abandonment of the union's contract
demands and the acceptance of the employers.
6 7
On petition for enforcement in the District of Columbia, the
court of appeals simply concluded that "the Boards' findings that
[the employer] had no reasonable basis for fearing a strike is not
60. Only several months prior to the negotiations in question, in
February of 1961, an unauthorized wildcat strike had occurred.
61. The Chicago yard was completely shut down as was virtually
all of the Toledo yard. The workers at the Buffalo yard were gradually
dismissed and only a major piece of work saved the employees at Lorain.
62. Although the Board had previously found that resorting to a
lockout to evade good faith bargaining constitutes an 8(a) (5) violation, the
fact that subsequent to the lockout the parties in this case had entered
into a new agreement made it unnecessary, in the Board's opinion, to
decide this issue.
63. The American Ship Building Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1382 (1963).
64. Id. at 1383.
65. Chairman McCulloch and Member Rodgers dissenting.
66. The American Shipbuilding Co., 142 N.L.R.B. at 1363.
67. Id. at 1365. In reaching this decision the Board majority relied




without the requisite record support." 68  To the employer's argu-
ment that in this case the bargaining lockout would be legal, the
court pointed out that it is for the Board to balance conflicting
interests.0 9
The Supreme Court chose the American Ship Building case to
resolve the conflict in the circuits over the state of the bargaining
lockout. In a way this is unfortunate because of the strike threat
issue involved. It would seem that the employer's action could
have been sustained as a legitimate use of the economic lockout.
Perhaps a better case would have involved a situation where it
was admitted that the union had never indicated that it contem-
plated strike action. 70 In such a situation there would be virtu-
ally no economic justification for a strike.
The concurring opinions of Justices White and Goldberg
criticize the majority for reaching out to decide an issue which is
not really present. According to these members of the Court, the
Board should have been reversed, not because the bargaining lock-
out was legal, but rather due to the failure of the Board to disclose
the basis of its order 71 or because no substantial evidence was
present to support the conclusion that the employer's fear of a
strike was unreasonable.
7 -2
Nevertheless, the majority did reach out. This was probably
due to the fact that both the lower court and the Board had
68. Local 374, Int'l. Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB (American Ship
Building), 331 F.2d 839, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
69. Ibid. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's statements in the
Truck Drivers (Buffalo Linen) case.
70. Such a case was Body & Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1964) which went up for enforcement after American Ship Building.
In that case there was no strike threat and virtually no evidence that
the employer was economically justified in locking out his employees
and the Board so found. The employer could have successfully resisted
the Board's charge only if his resort to a lockout to further his bargaining
position was found to be not an unfair labor practice. In a decision
reminiscent of the Quaker State case, the court enforced the Board's or-
der against the employer because, according to the Truck Drivers case, it
is for the Board to balance the interests.
71. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941), wherein the
Court said:
The administrative process will best be vindicated by clarity
in its exercise. Since Congress has defined the authority of the
Board . . . it will avoid needless litigation and make for effective
and expeditious enforcement of the Board's order to require the
Board to disclose the basis of its order.
Id. at 197.
72. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), wherein the
Court said: "The Board's findings are entitled to respect; but they must
nonetheless be set aside when the record before the Court of Appeals
clearly precludes the Board's decision from being justified . . . ." Id. at
490. The Court went on to say: "Whether on the record as a whole there
is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question which
Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals." Id. at 491.
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rejected the employer's argument that he had reason to fear a
strike. The majority apparently felt that there was ample evi-
dence to support this conclusion and never discussed the strike
threat issue. As an alternative, they confirmed the employer's
conduct by legalizing the bargaining lockout.
The majority reviewed the status of the lockout with respect
to the labor acts and found that nowhere is it expressly pro-
hibited.7 3 Instead, certain provisions refer directly to the strike
and lockout. 74 This led the court to say: "The correlative use of
the terms 'strike' and 'lockout' in these sections contemplates that
lockouts will be used in the bargaining process in some fashion. ' 75
This does not mean, of course, that the lockout can be employed
in every circumstance where the strike would be permitted.76 It
seems to be a recognition by the Court that, as they pertain to
73. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
74. Section 8(d) defines the duty to bargain collectively and sets
forth certain requirements for terminating or modifying the contract.
Among these is the requirement that the party "(4) continues in full
force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and
conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such
notice is given or until the expiration date." 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (4) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
Section 203 deals with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
and provides that: "(c) if the Director is not able to bring the parties to
agreement by conciliation within a reasonable time, he shall seek to induce
the parties voluntarily to seek other means of settling the dispute with-
out resort to strike, lockout, or other coercion." 61 Stat. 153 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 173(c) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
Section 206 deals with national emergencies and provides in part:
"Whenever in the opinion of the President of the United States, a threat-
ened or actual strike or lock-out affecting an entire industry." 61 Stat. 155
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 176 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
Section 208 deals with conduct subject to injunction and provides
in part:
(a) upon receiving a report from a board of inquiry the
President may direct the Attorney General to petition any district
court ... to enjoin such strike or lock-out . . . and if the court
finds that such threatened or actual strike or lock-out
(ii) if permitted to occur or continue, will imperil the na-
tional health or safety, it shall have jurisdiction to en-
join any such strike or lockout ....
61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
75. 380 U.S. at 315.
76. Koretz, supra note 26, in commenting on the Morand case and
the Board's rejection of the proposition that strikes and lockouts can be
equated, states:
Of course the Board is correct in rejecting any such notion.
But this proves very little; it seems only to be saying that an em-
ployer may not lockout for reasons proscribed by the Act - a
proposition that no reasonable person would challenge, and which
apparently no one has really challenged in the cases under discus-
sion. For there hardly can be any doubt that the NLRA has to




collective bargaining, the strike and lockout are economic correla-
tives.
In matching the employer's conduct against specific statutory
provisions, a practice suggested and used by the Fifth Circuit in
Dalton Brick, the American Ship Building Court found that
neither the employees right to bargain collectively 77 nor the
right to strike 8 had been abridged. Accordingly, no violation of
8(a) (1) was made out. And, since there was no showing that
the employer's motivation in calling the lockout was to discourage
union membership, no violation of 8 (a) (3) occurred. 79 What the
Court appears to be implying is that all lockouts are now legal
unless they can be denominated "anti-union.
8 0
The authors of the concurring opinions take exception to this
on two counts. In other cases, certain conduct on the part of the
employer has been prohibited even though there is no affirmative
showing of anti-union motivation. Thus, granting superseniority
to replacements is an unfair labor practice absent any showing of
unlawful provocation and even though the employer claims that
such action was necessary to continue operations."' The majority
responded to this argument by saying that these cases concern:
.. .practices which are inherently so prejudicial to union
interests and so devoid of significant economic justification
that no specific evidence of intent to discourage union
membership or other antiunion animus is required.
But this lockout does not fall into that category of
cases.
8 2
77. Here the Court distinguished between a hostility to the process
of collective bargaining and the simple intention to support a bargaining
position. 380 U.S. at 309.
78. Here the Court stated that the right to strike was the right to
cease work and not, in addition, the power to determine exclusively
where work stoppages shall occur. 380 U.S. at 310.
79. Hereafter the Board will be compelled to distinguish between a
desire to discourage union membership from a desire to affect the outcome
of the negotiations. 380 U.S. at 312.
80. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
81. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). See also
NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964) (Board may disregard
motive where two employees who solicited for the union were erroneously
discharged); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1953) (Specific
evidence of illegal intent is dispensable where employer granted retro-
active wage increase to union members and refused such benefits to other
employees); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (Un-
necessary to find illegal motivation where the employer posted a broad
no-solicitation rule). But see Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 667 (1961) (Union's use of a hiring hall arrangement is not unlawful
unless discrimination results); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105
(1956) (Absent showing of intentional discrimination, employer may re-
fuse to permit distribution of union literature on company premises).
82. 380 U.S. at 311.
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In addition, the minority points out that even where there is
no showing that the employer was actuated by illegal motivation,
an unfair labor practice charge can still be sustained if the business
justification for the conduct does not outweigh the curtailment of
employee rights. And it is for the Board to weigh the justification
against the contraction of rights and balance the interests. Again
the majority responded, this time by saying:
The Board has justified its ruling in this case and its
general approach to the legality of lockouts on the basis of
its special competence to weigh the competing interests
according to its expert judgment.
However, we think that the Board construes its func-
tion too expansively when it claims general authority to
define national labor policy by balancing the competing in-
terests of labor and management.
8 3
The Board, when it felt impelled to balance conflicting in-
terests, has consistently maintained that when an impasse in
bargaining is reached, the union's only weapon is the strike.
8,4
After negotiations stall, however, the employer may institute a
unilateral increase to employees which was proposed but not
accepted by the union during negotiations or continue the terms of
the old contract.85 In addition, he can permanently replace strik-
ers"' or hire temporary replacements for employees who have been
legally locked out by the unstruck members of a multi-employer
association."7 And, of course, he can blunt the effects of union
activity by stockpiling or subcontracting. If the employer is given
the additional weapon of the bargaining lockout, this, as stated by
the Board, would "so substantially tip the scales in the employer's
favor as to defeat the Congressional purpose of placing employees
on a par with their adversaries at the bargaining table."8 8
The statement by the majority that the "Board construes its
function too expansively" was probably a most painful sentence
for the Board to observe. In the Truck Drivers case, which in-
volved a conflict between the right to strike and the legality of
the multi-employer lockout, a unanimous Court stated:
The ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting
legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance
to effectuate national labor policy . .. the Congress com-
mitted primarily to the National Labor Relations Board,
subject to limited judicial review. 89
83. Id. at 315-16.
84. See, e.g., the Board's opinions in the Morand and Davis Furniture
cases. See also Koretz, supra note 26 at 271.
85. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949);
NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963).
86. NLRB v. Mackey Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
87. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
88. Brief for the NLRB, p. 17, American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,
380 U.S. 300 (1965).
89. 353 U.S. at 96. Accord, Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324
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The majority's present statement did nothing but add further
confusion as to what part the Board is to play in implementing
labor policy.
It is difficult to find fault with Justice Goldberg's opinion
that the legalization of the bargaining lockout should be handled
on a case by case basis.9 0 A holding that all employers may lock
out to break an impasse would legalize certain conduct which
may be overly offensive. The length, character and history of
the bargaining relationship between the parties should be re-
viewed before an unequivocal answer is given.91 And even the
court, in Dalton Brick, which also matched employer conduct
against specific sections, admitted that "each case must be care-
fully measured by its own setting.
'9 2
Inquiry into the history of the party's bargaining relationship
should also be used to ascertain whether other types of lockouts
are legal. Thus an employer with a history of reticence during
negotiations who locks out at first sight of an impasse could very
easily be guilty of an anti-union lockout, whereas one who has
consistently bargained in good faith and who locks out only after
repeated attempts at conciliation would be protected. Conversely,
if the pattern of the union's actions during previous negotiations
has constantly included a strike then an employer who locks out
when the contract expires would be using a legal economic lockout
because of the strike-threat. If the union has never resorted to a
strike, however, the consequent lockout should not be protected.
Admittedly, these are extremes and it is for the Board to untangle
the mass of cases which would fall in between.
If an employer is allowed to lockout his employees to support
his bargaining position, it would seem that he will, in addition, be
U.S. 793 (1945); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941). But see
NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union 361 U.S. 477 (1960), where the
Court said:
It is one thing to say that the Board has been afforded flexi-
bility to determine . . .whether a party's conduct at the bargain-
ing table evidences a real desire to come into agreement. It is
quite another matter, however, to say that the Board has been af-
forded flexibility in picking and choosing which economic devices
of labor and management shall be branded as unlawful.____---
We have expressed our belief that this amounts to the Board's
entrance into the substantive aspects of the bargaining process to
an extent Congress has not countenanced.
361 U.S. at 498.
90. This opinion seems to be in substantial accord with that es-
poused by Koretz, supra note 26, and restated in Koretz, The Lockout
Revisited, 7 SYMACUSE L. REV. 263 (1956).
91. As to the consideration of these factors compare Quaker State Oil
Ref. Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1959) and Utah Plumbing &
Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1961), with
NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp. 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962) and
American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
92. 301 F.2d at 894.
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permitted to hire temporary replacements. This will be true if
his conduct is simply matched against the applicable sections and
no illegal motivation is shown.93 And the conclusion will be rein-
forced if the Board is not permitted to balance the conflicting
interests.
94
In NLRB v. Brown,95 decided the same day as American Ship
Building, the Supreme Court held that not only may the unstruck
members of a multi-employer bargaining unit lock out their em-
ployees,9 but also they may hire temporary replacements. It
would seem that this is the first step to a tacit recognition that a
single employer may not only lock out his employees in support
of his bargaining position but also hire temporary replacements.
However, this may not be so. A struck employer may hire
replacements whether he is bargaining singly or as part of an
association. If the unstruck members of the unit choose to lock
out as a defensive measure and are prohibited from hiring re-
placements, this places them in a different bargaining position
than the member who is struck. They will then be constrained
into severing their relations with the bargaining unit and com-
ing to terms separately with the union. Therefore, the integrity
of the association cannot be preserved and the decision in Truck
Drivers degenerates to a nullity. As opposed to this, if the un-
struck members are permitted to lock out and hire replacements,
this places them on a par with the struck members and the in-
tegrity of the unit is assured.
The same considerations are not present in the single employer
bargaining lockout. Here the employer offensively terminates the
employment relationship at the time negotiations fail. This places
a financial burden on the employees and brings economic pressure
to bear on the union. At the same time the employer has imposed
similar economic pressure on himself by shutting down his plant.
Thus the parties are at odds in relatively equivalent positions and
a rough balance is struck. If the employer is permitted to reopen
his plant by hiring replacements, however, the balance is destroyed
in favor of the employer. This casts a great deal of doubt as to
whether a bargaining lockout could be followed by a hiring of
replacements.98
The Court's decision in American Ship Building legalizes the
bargaining lockout only after an impasse has been reached. By
93. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
94. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
95. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
96. A fact established by the Court in its Truck Drivers decision.
97. See NLRB v. Mackey Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
98. But see the opinion in American Ship Building where the major-
ity stated that "the right to bargain collectively does not entail any'right' to insist on one's position free from economic disadvantage."
380 U.S. at 309.
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restricting the use of the bargaining lockout in this manner, the
Court has adopted earlier statements which seem to assume that if
such a lockout is legal at all, it will be so only after the occurrence
of an impasse.9 9 This raises several questions. No clear cut defini-
tion of what constitutes an impasse can be articulated. Whether
an impasse has, in fact, occurred is something presumably within
the exclusive competence of the Board subject to requisite re-
view. 100 The question still remains: why must an impasse occur
before the bargaining lockout is legal?' 0 1
It appears that, as in the case of hiring replacements, if the
conduct of the employer in locking out during negotiations
solely to advance his bargaining position is matched against spe-
cific statutory provisions and no illegal motivation is found then
an unfair labor practice charge cannot be maintained. 0 2  Again
this result is reinforced if the Board may not balance the con-
flicting interests. 0 3 Then, too, the lockout cannot realistically be
viewed as the correlative of the strike if it can be resorted to only
after an impasse.
It could be argued that by restricting the bargaining lockout
only to such a situation the employer will be tempted to devise
an impasse. As such, the Board will have the arduous task of
distinguishing between a real and imaginary impasse.
0 4
In response to this it could be pointed out that under Board
decisions recognizing the legality only of the economic lockout
employers were invited to contrive operational exoneration by
provoking a strike. Since both situations involve an analysis of
99. See note 6 supra and text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
100. See the American Ship Building and Dalton Brick & Tile cases
for situations where the Board found that a bargaining impasse had
occurred. In Quaker State the attempt at bargaining had only been
temporarily exhausted.
101. One answer to this is, of course, that both employer and union
must bargain in good faith by virtue of § 8 (a) (5) and § 8(b) (3) and fail
to do so constitutes an unfair labor practice. However, if, at the inception
of the strike or lockout, the parties separate and later come to terms,
deciding an issue involving these sections should be unnecessary. See
note 62 supra.
Another reason could be that the impasse is arbitrarily set as the
point before which the lockout automatically becomes tainted with anti-
union motivation.
102. See text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
103. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
104. In the Quaker State case the court made this statement:
[The employer] argues that the element of continuance of
negotiations amounts to nothing as an employer could deliberately
assume an inflexible position at the negotiations, bring them to an
impasse and thus clear away the objection to his calling a lockout
while negotiations were proceeding. The immediate answer to
that is, should a breakoff in bargaining be found by the Board to
be a contrived thing by the employer, the resultant lockout would
hardly obtain its approval.
270 F.2d at 45.
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the employer's motivation, it should be no more difficult to dif-
ferentiate between a real and imaginary impasse than to charac-
terize economic justification as contrived or bona fide. The answer
to this response is that by legalizing the bargaining lockout, the
use of contrived economic reasons as an excuse for a lockout will
probably diminish. Or the employer will be given the alternatives
of either fabricating an impasse or provoking a strike. If the
Board is still required to make very fine distinctions in order to
ascertain whether the conduct is legal, then the Court has either
substituted one difficult problem for another or added an enigma
that did not previously exist.
It would seem that the same considerations as to whether an
impasse is real or imaginary exist as to whether or not the
lockout is anti-union. Using Justice Goldberg's exposition, this
would involve an investigation of such factors as the length,
character and history of the bargaining relationship. If these fac-
tors indicate that the employer has previously engaged in a series
of good faith negotiations and uses the lockout only to support his
bargaining position, it seems capricious to wait for an irreconcil-
able impasse. Conversely, if these factors indicate that the em-
ployer has consistently frustrated the union's bargaining attempts,
then the lockout should not be protected even though a real
impasse occurs.
As pointed out previously, whether an employer is economi-
cally justified in locking out his employees because of a strike or
strike threat should be determined only after a proper analysis of
such factors as the length, character and history of the parties'
bargaining relationship. From these elements it could be ascer-
tained whether or not a strike was provoked or whether a strike
threat was real or imaginary. And if the occurrence of an
impasse is due to good faith bargaining or contrivance depends on
a similar inquiry. Although this appears to be a pursuit of an-
swers to a variety of questions it would seem that in all cases the
inquiry should be the same, i.e. whether this is an anti-union
lockout.
There is little warrant for obscuring the formidable problem
of deciding whether certain conduct is illegal by employing such
terms as "economic justification," "threat of strike" or "impasse."
It is submitted that if the above factors indicate that the lockout
was not prompted by actionable motivation, no unfair labor prac-
tice charge should be established. As a result, only anti-union
lockouts would be proscribed.
ROBERT A. MmLS
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